RECENT APPELLATE NEWS, NOTES, AND DECISIONS
Fourth Circuit inches closer to a full bench
For years now, Ive been railing (well, in a muted way) about the need for the United States Senate to fill the many vacancies in the Fourth Circuit. Once upon a time, when there were five vacancies among the 15 authorized seats, I noted that A third of the Fourth is missing.
Last week, the Senate voted to approve the nomination of Judge Jim Wynn of
Its also an excellent sign on a personal level. I had the good fortune to meet Judge Wynn last October at the ABA Appellate Summit, and found him to be a particularly gracious and engaging person. Im very happy for him, and for those litigants and attorneys who have cases in the court.
Note to the 100 in
Next Appellate Practice Institute announced
A new chief
A new feature on this site
Youve seen the note before, whenever I post analysis of unpublished SCV orders: Since todays order is unpublished, it wont appear on the court’s website and it wont show up in Virginia Reports. If any of you want a copy, contact me and Ill send you one. Last month, I attended a presentation by one of my regular readers, a jurist from the State of
You know what? Shes right. While these orders dont carry the same weight as published opinions, and are next to useless as authority in appellate briefs, they still can pack a lot of punch if you can hand one up to a trial judge. I decided, based on her honors implicit suggestion, that there needs to be a place where you can go and get copies of these orders for use in your practice.
Analysis of recent CAV opinions
The Court of Appeals has been as busy as I have lately, issuing nine published opinions in the past two weeks. All of the new decisions are in the field of criminal law, and the criminal appellants are taking a juridical pounding. In one case last week, an appellant secured one reversal but lost on the other conviction he appealed; in all of the other eight appeals, the appellants lost completely. I have some pals in the Attorney Generals Office, and while I doubt theyre going around the office high-fiving each other, theyre probably at least whistling through the hallways these days.
For example, today the court rules that the Wong Sun doctrine doesnt bar admission of evidence discovered after a detainee decided to become a flee-ee. (Okay; it should be flee-er. But give me some poetic license here.) In Fitchett v. Commonwealth, a
During the pursuit, Fitchett stumbled in a driveway, and that’s when the gun fell out of his waistband. Thats an unfavorable development, because Fitchett was you knew this was coming, right? a convicted felon. He moved to suppress the weapon, contending that he was illegally seized without probable cause. Today, the CAV assumes without deciding that the seizure was illegal, and affirms the conviction anyway. It cites a couple of cases that look right on point, for the proposition that when a suspect flees and evidence rains down during the pursuit, that evidence isnt the fruit of the poisonous tree of the original stop. Even Wong Sun had held that its exclusionary prohibition didnt apply to all evidence discovered after an illegal stop; just that evidence that was obtained either during or as a “direct result of the illegal search.
Also today, the court takes up a DUI appeal with an unexpected defendant, in Rix v. Commonwealth. When I worked in
Okay; these werent the smartest suspects on the streets that day. But alcohol affects your judgment one of the primary reason we dont want drunks driving and maybe Rix didnt consider in those desperate seconds that she was essentially volunteering to be prosecuted for DUI.
It didnt matter; on examination, she had many of the classic signs of intoxication, so the officer told her she was a suspect. It was at this point that she sprung the trap, telling the officer that she hadnt been driving. (There goes the ruse; discarded like a used coffee filter. One wonders whether she suddenly decided in a panic to throw her pal under the police car.) The officer, unmoved, arrested her anyway.
Smith v. Commonwealth is an appeal from convictions for attempted rape and abduction with intent to defile. The victim, a juvenile, was a friend of Smiths live-in girlfriend. As the victim walked past Smiths house one day, he beckoned her inside, telling her that his girlfriend wanted to see her. The girl came into the house and asked where her friend was; Smith answered that she was in a bedroom. When the girl went inside that room, Smith followed her, closed the door, and tried to rape her.
Technically, there are two issues in todays ruling, but in reality only one of those merits publication of this opinion. Smith challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, claiming that the victim had given statements with a few conflicting details, so her testimony was, as a matter of law, not credible. The court notes in response that issues of credibility, even where a witness has given conflicting statements, are for the jury to evaluate. Lawyers hoping for an appellate finding that testimony is inherently incredible are in for a long wait.
The real issue in this case is whether Smith could be simultaneously convicted of these two crimes, given the incidental-detention doctrine. That principle provides that where the victim is restrained only in a way thats intrinsic to another crime, then that restraint is not a separate offense of abduction. Smith argued that the evidence didnt show that he restrained the victim other than as a part of the attempted rape. Looks like he may have a point here.
But the Court of Appeals affirms today. It analyzes a four-part test to determine whether a given restraint is incidental to another crime, and concludes that in this case, Smiths acts constituted a separate act of detention. To my thinking, one single case citation, cited near the end of todays opinion, provides all the authority the court needed for this conclusion. In 2004, the Supreme Court of Virginia decided a habeas-corpus case in which the court found that luring the victim inside a house under false pretenses, and then attacking him, constituted two separate crimes. Thats just what Smith did here, deceiving the young victim into thinking that her friend wanted to talk with her.
As noted above, last week was little better for those seeking to shed their criminal convictions. The appellant in Wade v. Commonwealth discovered to her dismay that you can, too, be convicted as a principal in the second degree even though youre only charged with a misdemeanor. Theres a statute that deals with such principals in felony prosecutions, but theres no companion provisions for misdemeanors. But a panel of the CAV construes that statute to mean that with misdemeanors, everyone is a principal in the first degree.
The appellant in Montgomery v. Commonwealth was unquestionably denied the exercise of the statutory right of allocution. If you dont swim in these waters often, allocution is where the judge asks the defendant if theres anything he wants to say before sentence is pronounced. Maybe you just thought that the nice judge was being polite to the poor defendant. But the Code of Virginia requires the judge to give the defendant a chance to say something before learning his fate, and that didnt happen in
The defense lawyer didnt speak up then, but he did soon thereafter, during a hearing on a bail motion, at which the judge said the functional equivalent of, Golly; I guess I forgot. Okay, Ill give him a chance to speak now if he wants. The court then asked the defense lawyer if he wanted to make a statement at this point for the record, but the lawyer, perhaps sensing that he had at least the potential for a winning issue here, declined.
That might have been a good strategy, but it failed on a tactical level. In order for an appellate court to evaluate whether the exclusion of material is harmful to the appellant, the court needs to know what that material is. Thats why I always encourage litigants to proffer clean copies of excluded or involuntarily redacted documents, so a reviewing court can see whether it would have made a difference. The court thus affirms since it doesnt have a satisfactory record of whatever the excluded allocution would have been.
Another tactical problem sabotages what might have been a sound strategy, this time in Alford v. Commonwealth. Alford was indicted for attempted rape. At the conclusion of the evidence, the prosecutor and defense lawyer very civilly agreed on a set of jury instructions, so there was no need for that dreary part of the trial proceedings. (Most trial lawyers regard arguments on jury instructions as the usually dreadful exercise you have to go through in order to get to the shining moment of closing argument.) One of those instructions was for the lesser-included offense of assault and battery. The jurors thought that instruction made sense in the context of the evidence, so they returned a verdict of guilty on the A&B charge.
Mulling over what happened, Alfords lawyer concluded that A&B really isnt a lesser-included offense of attempted rape. He appealed and asked the Court of Appeals to throw the conviction out. Last week, a panel issued a short (just three pages) opinion swatting that argument aside, since the lawyer had agreed to the A&B instruction. Plainly, you cant ask the trial court to do something and then argue in an appellate court that the trial court wasnt authorized to do that; that approach is the approbation and reprobation thats decried in so many dusty appellate decisions.
The lawyer also had the good sense to ask the CAV to apply the ends-of-justice exception to the contemporaneous objection rule. Good move on his part; the court simply will not invoke that exception sua sponte, so if you want any hope of taking advantage of it, you need to speak up in your brief, or else forever hold your peace. But that exception is only triggered to avoid a grave injustice, and the court notes that it can hardly be a grave injustice to give an agreed instruction for a one-year-maximum offense when the defendant is charged with a ten-year-maximum offense.